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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CENTRAL UTAH WATER CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT, A Water Conservancy
District organized under the laws
of the State of Utah,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.

Supreme Court Case No.
20110618-SC

SHANE KING, as Trustee and/or
Fiduciary Owner of Stepping Stone
Trust,
Defendant and Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this proceeding pursuant to 78A-3102 (3)(a) and (5) UCA, and pursuant to Order of the Supreme Court dated and entered
October 5, 2011, granting the Petition for Certiorari of Defendant and Appellant, Shane
King, as Trustee and/or Fiduciary Owner of Stepping Stone Trust (hereinafter "King").

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
SOLE ISSUE:
The sole issue presented for review pursuant to the aforesaid Order of the Supreme
Court granting King's Petition for Certiorari is:
"Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Petitioner's appeal
without prejudice on the ground the order denying a motion for new trial
did not satisfy the requirements of this Court's decision in Giusti v. Sterling
WentworthCorp., 2009 UT 2, 201 P.3d 966, and rule 7(f)(2) of the Rules
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

of Civil Procedure."
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW FOR SAID ISSUE:

i

The standard of review is stated in Code v. Utah Dep 't of Health, 2007 UT 43, 162
P.3d 1097, 1098:
(

"'Whether appellate jurisdiction exists is a question of law which we review
for correctness, giving no deference to the decision below.' Pledger v.
Gillespie, 1999 UT 54,116, 982 P.2d 572."
STATEMENT SHOWING THAT ISSUE WAS PRESERVED FOR APPEAL
The aforesaid issue arose in the Court of Appeals and not in the trial court, and the
error was duly preserved by timely petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals decision
dismissing King's appeal without prejudice is found at 2011 UT App 200, and was
entered on June 23, 2011. Petition for Certiorari was filed within the prescribed 30 day
period on July 20, 2011.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS. STATUTES.
ORDINANCES. AND REGULATIONS
Rule 7(f)(2) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
"Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party
shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other
parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections
to the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party
preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an
objection or upon expiration of the time to object."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE. This action was brought by plaintiff and

2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellee, Central Utah Water Conservancy District (hereinafter "District"), seeking to
condemn six waterfront lots belonging to King located in the Crescent Lakes Subdivision
which is a 107 lot subdivision located along the shore of the Big Sandwash Reservoir at
Upalco in Duchesne County, Utah. (Complaint filed 4/20/06.) (R. 3)
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. This action was commenced April 19,
2006. (R. 38) Prior to trial, King served a motion in limine and supporting memorandum
and ex parte application for leave to file over-length memorandum and notice to submit
same on July 31, 2010 , seeking among other things to preclude the District's appraiser
from using five sales as comparables which sales occurred in 1995, eleven years prior to
the commencement of this action. (Motion in Limine, Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion in Limine, Defendant's Application to File Over-Length
Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine and Notice to Submit same were filed
August 2, 2010, however originals do not appear to be in the record and have apparently
been misfiled in the district court clerk's office in Duchesne. Unless the clerk's office
can locate the originals, duplicates will need to be substituted pursuant to Rule 11(h) U.
Rules of App. P., however, said documents are not necessary to a consideration of the
jurisdictional issue now before this court.) (R.286, 287)
The motion in limine was argued before Hon. Edwin T. Peterson on September 20,
2010, and granted in part, but denied as to said five sales. (Minute Entry 09/20/10) (R.
441) The case was tried to a jury before Judge Peterson on October 12, 13 and 14 of
2010 on the sole issue of valuation. (Minute Entry and Minutes of Jury Trial dated
3
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October 12, 13 and 14 of 2010.) (R. 632, 637 and 667)
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURTS
DISPOSITION IN DISTRICT COURT: A jury verdict for King was returned for
$56,100. ( Special Verdict filed 10/14/10.) (R. 638) Final Judgment of Condemnation
was entered for $56,100 plus interest at 8% per annum on $27,700 thereof on November
8, 2010. (Final Judgment of Condemnation filed 11/08/10, and Appendix Doc. 1.) (R.
696) King served a motion for a new trial with supporting memorandum with oral
argument requested on November 19, 2010. (Motion and Memorandum filed 11/22/10.)
(R. 700, 702) After briefing, Notice to Submit was filed December 22, 2010. (Notice to
Submit filed 12/22/10.) (R. 746)

The District Court prepared, signed and filed its own

order entitled "RULING AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL" denying motion for a new trial on February 8,2011. (Ruling and Order on
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial filed 02/08/11, and Appendix Doc. 2.) (R. 756)
Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court was filed on March 9, 2011. (Notice of
Appeal filed 03/09/11, and Appendix Doc. 3.) (R. 758, 760)
DISPOSITION IN UTAH COURT OF APPEALS:
The appeal was to the Supreme Court, and Docketing Statement, Request for
Transcript and Letter containing reasons why appeal should be retained by the Supreme
Court were filed in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court raised no issue of lack of
jurisdiction while the case was in that court, however on April 5, 2011, by order of the
Supreme Court the appeal was transferred to the Court of Appeals. (R. 771)
4
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On April

11, 2011, a Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition was filed in the Court of
Appeals. (Appendix Doc. 4.) On April 29, 2011, Appellant's Memorandum Opposing
Dismissal of Appeal was filed in the Court of Appeals. Appellee filed no response
thereto. On June 23, 2011, a Per Curiam Decision of the Court of Appeals was filed as
2011UT App 200, ordering the appeal "dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a
timely appeal from a final order." (Appendix Doc. 5.) (R. 779) No petition for
rehearing was filed, and this Petition for Certiorari was filed on July 20, 2011.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since this petition relates to jurisdiction and not to the merits of the case, the
relevant jurisdictional facts are already set forth in the preceding sections of this brief.
Nevertheless, to assist the court the full text of the ruling and order prepared, signed and
filed by the District Court on February 8, 2011 (Appendix Doc. 2) (R. 756), and entitled
"RULING AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL" is as
follows:
"This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion for a new Trial.
"Under rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal [sic] Procedure, a new trial
may be granted 'in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety
which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party.' The
Defendant raises two (2) general areas of concern in the motion for a new
trial, both of which involve rulings made in either pre-trial hearings or at
trial. It should be noted that Defendant was given the opportunity to fully
argue the issues prior to the Court ruling on them, and to make objection to
those rulings thereby creating a record for appeal during the course of the
litigation. Defendants [sic] motion for a new trial therefore consists wholly
of issues which were argued and ruled upon. The Court, having considered
the issued [sic] raised by Defendant in the motion for a new trial finds
5
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nothing in the various rulings that justify a new trial. The issues raised by
Defendant may be the appropriate basis for an appeal of those rulings but
does not provide a basis for a motion for a new trial. As previously noted
each issue raised by Defendant was fully argued during the hearing(s) on
those issues, therefore the Court would not be assisted by redundant oral
argument of those issues and will rule on the motion without oral argument.
"The Defendant's Motion for a New Trail is denied.
"Dated this _8th day of February ,2011.
"BY THE COURT:
/S/ Edwin T. Peterson
EDWIN T. PETERSON, District Court Judge"
It appears the District Court identified the foregoing documents as a ruling and an
order to direct and inform counsel that no further order was being required, and no other
order was prepared by either party.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING KING'S
APPEAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE ON THE GROUND THE ORDER DENYING A
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL DID NOT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF GIUSTI
V. STERLING WENTWORTH AND RULE 7(f)(2) OF THE RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
A. DECISION AND STATED GROUNDS OF COURT OF APPEALS:
The Court of Appeals stated that it dismissed this appeal without prejudice,
because it felt compelled to do so because of the Supreme Court's decision in Giusti v.
Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, 201 P.3d 966, stating that said decision "created a
bright line rule for litigants because '[t]he strict application of rule 7(f)(2)'" supports

6
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t

finality and prevents confusion. The Court of Appeals concluded that the order denying
the motion for a new trial was not final, and they therefore had no jurisdiction and had no
other option than to dismiss the appeal.
The decision in Giusti however was based upon the Supreme Court's decision in
Code v. Utah Dep 't of Health, supra, which preserved a long standing exception to any
such "bright line," and the Court of Appeals ignores Code and said exception.
B. JUDGE PETERSON'S "RULING AND ORDER" WAS CLEAR AND
EXPLICIT, BUT IN ADDITION THIS CASE FALLS WITHIN THE EXCEPTION
ACKNOWLEDGED AND PRESERVED IN CODE AND WHICH WAS NOT
CHANGED BY GIUSTI.
It is King's contention that the Court of Appeals erred in two respects. First, that
when Judge Peterson's entitled his denial of King's motion for a new trial as a "Ruling
and Order" it met the requirements of the general rule as established by Rule 7(f)(2) as
interpreted by Code and Giusti, and second, this case involves "preservation" of
jurisdiction and thus falls within an exception to the general rule which exception was
explained and preserved in Code, and not eliminated by Giusti.
Rule 7(f)(2) requires the parties to submit an order "unless otherwise directed by
the court." Code interpreted this requirement at ^[3 this way:
"It is the district court's role to clearly direct that no order needs to be
submitted; otherwise, an order is required. A court should include this
explicit direction whenever it intends a document - to constitute its final
action. Otherwise, rule 7(f)(2) requires the preparation and filing of an
order to trigger finality for purposes of appeal." (Emphasis added.)
Giusti also uses the term "explicitly" but it appears that all that is intended thereby is that

7
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the district court convey a "clear" direction to the lawyers as to what is required. Since
Judge Peterson entitled his document "Ruling and Order," it must have been for a reason.
That reason is that he was thereby telling the lawyers that this was not just a ruling, but
that it was also the order formalizing and finalizing that ruling for all purposes. The
parties understood clearly what the court was telling them, and no one is quarreling with
jurisdiction except the Court of Appeals. What the Court of Appeals is in effect saying is
that "clear" is not enough. They are saying that the district court judge has to use the
magic words "no other order is required" or appellate jurisdiction cannot exist.
In any event this case falls withing an exception to the general rule of Code and
Giusti, which we now discuss.
C. HOLDING IN CODE ACKNOWLEDGES AND PRESERVES EXCEPTION
TO THE GENERAL RULE:
Code was in the Supreme Court On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals, and
the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. In Code the District Court had entered
a memorandum decision dismissing plaintiffs complaint. The defendant in that case
(prevailing party on said motion) did not prepare a separate order, but plaintiff did, and
the same was duly entered, and plaintiff based her appeal on the latter. The Court of
Appeals held that the time for appeal ran from the entry of the Memorandum Decision
and not from the entry of the later order, and that plaintiffs appeal was therefore
untimely. The Supreme Court reversed.
Code however expressly acknowledged an exception to its general

8
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rule for cases where the issue was "preservation" of the appeal. Code cited Dove v. Cude,
710 P.2d 170 (Utah 1985) and Cannon v. Keller, 692 P.2d 740 (Utah 1984), which held
that when the ruling 'constituted a resolution of the dispute' [Dove] or 'specifie[d] with
certainty a final determination of the rights of the parties,'[Cannon] appellate jurisdiction
was proper, and the Code decision held that "While these cases remain good authority for
that purpose, we decline to use their analysis to bar appeal rights, as the analysis of the
court of appeals would do."
D. HOLDING IN GIUSTI EXTENDS CODE TO ORDERS OF ALL KINDS
BUT DOES NOT ELIMINATE EXCEPTION AS PRESERVED IN CODE, WHERE
ISSUE IS PRESERVATION OF APPEAL:
The strict rule of Code thus applies to cases contesting jurisdiction , and Giusti
adopts the same general rule but in ^f 36 clarifies that the strict rule of Code "applies to all
final decisions not just to a "memorandum decision." Thus Giusti clarifies that the Code
rule is not limited to memorandum decisions, but that clarification does not purport to
eliminate the exception as set out in Code for cases involving preservation of jurisdiction.
E. COURT OF APPEALS LACKS AUTHORITY TO OVERRULE SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS IN DOVE V CUDE AND CANNON V KELLER AS
PRESERVED IN CODE:
If the Supreme Court intended by the ruling in Giusti to overrule Code in any
respect, but through oversight did not do so, then it would appear that only the Supreme
Court can correct such an oversight, and the Court of Appeals cannot do it for them.
After being reversed in Code, the Court of Appeals claims to be on board with
Supreme Court in Giusti, but in dismissing the current appeal the Utah Court of Appeals
9
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goes too far, and now refuses to acknowledge the exception created by Code for cases
involving preservation of jurisdiction, and this case therefore falls squarely
within Rule 46 (a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides for
Supreme Court review:
"When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of state or
federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme
Court."
F. COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION SETS AN UNNECESSARY AND
UNWISE PRECEDENT:
The Court of Appeal in dismissing the current appeal is stating in effect that unless
the lower court uses the magic words "no other order is necessary" that the appellate
courts have no jurisdiction under any circumstances. That is an unnecessary and unwise
restriction on jurisdiction, which seeks to preclude the appellate courts, now and forever
apparently, from applying practical solutions where they are called for, as in Dove and
Cannon and in the present case.
G. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION CREATES CONFUSION:
The decision of the Court of Appeals does not eliminate confusion, but rather has
created confusion where none existed. Before the current decision of the Court of
Appeals, it was clear that for purposes of opposing jurisdiction, it was necessary to show
compliance with Rule 7(f)(2), but such a showing was not necessary in preservation
cases. The Court of Appeals has now held that strict requirement applies to both cases
opposing jurisdiction and to cases preserving jurisdiction, but since the Court of Appeals

10
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cannot overrule decisions of the Supreme Court, their decision does not technically
overrule the Code exception, but as a practical matter a litigant confronted with a
preservation of appeal case, is left to ponder whether the Code exception is the law or
whether this decision of the Court of Appeals seemingly overruling the Code exception is
now being accepted by the Supreme Court as the law.
H. GIUSTI AND CODE WERE INTENDED TO PREVENT INJUSTICE NOT
TO FOSTER IT:
Both Giusti and Code were cases where the prevailing party was attempting to
have the appellate court throw out the loser's appeal on the basis that the appeal was
untimely. In effect the court in Giusti and Code was refusing to disallow an appeal when
the losing party had done all that could reasonably have been expected of them, and those
decisions were designed to prevent injustice.
We are not dealing with that situation in the present appeal. The issue here is
whether an appeal timely taken and which was (1) based upon a "Ruling and Order"
which was clearly and explicitly intended as a final order, (2) which unequivocally
denied the motion for new trial which is all it needed to do, (3) where no one was in fact
misled and (4) where no one is contesting jurisdiction should be gratuitously dismissed.
Surely, the Supreme Court answered this in the negative in Code.
ARGUMENTS
POINT 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING KING'S
APPEAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE ON THE GROUND THE ORDER DENYING A
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL DID NOT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF GIUSTI
V. STERLING WENTWORTH AND RULE 7(f)(2) OF THE RULES OF CIVIL
11
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PROCEDURE.
A. DECISION AND STATED GROUNDS OF COURT OF APPEALS:
The Court of Appeals has dismissed this appeal without prejudice. It did so
apparently based upon the belief of the panel that it was compelled to do so by the
Supreme Court's decision in Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp. , supra. The Court of
Appeals held at ^[5 including therein a quote from Giusti:
"The supreme court created a bright line rule for litigants because ' [t]he
strict application of rule 7(f)(2) supports the judicial policy favoring
finality, and it prevents the confusion that often leads - as it has here - to
additional litigation when parties are left to divine when a court's decision
has triggered the appeal period.' Id. f 36., the order denying the motion for
a new trail is not final for purposes of appeal, and this court is required to
dismiss the appeal. See Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 161 P.2d 569,
570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating that if the court lacks jurisdiction over an
appeal, it has only the authority to dismiss the action)."
The decision in Giusti was actually based upon the Supreme Court's decision in
Code v. Utah Dep 't of Health, supra.. At ^f 23 the court in Giusti held:
"That rule [Rule 7(f)(2)], along with our holding in Code v. Utah Depot of
Health, establish that the July judgment was necessary, and therefore,
Giusti's appeal was timely."
Giusti further holds at ]j25: "The plain language of the rule [Rule 7(f)(2)], along with our
decision in Code, support Giusti's argument." Again at ]f29 Giusti holds: "This result is
supported by our recent decision in Code, in which we explained the correct application
of rule 7(f)(2)."
This case thus involves the correct interpretation of said Rule 7(f)(2) as interpreted
by Giusti and Code.
12
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B. JUDGE PETERSON'S "RULING AND ORDER" WAS CLEAR AND
EXPLICIT, BUT IN ADDITION THIS CASE FALLS WITHIN THE EXCEPTION
ACKNOWLEDGED AND PRESERVED IN CODE AND WHICH WAS NOT
CHANGED BY GIUSTL
It is King's contention that the Court of Appeals erred in two respects. First, that
when Judge Peterson's entitled his denial of King's motion for a new trial as a "Ruling
and Order" it met the requirements of the general rule as established by Rule 7(f)(2) as
interpreted by Code and Giusti, and second, this case involves "preservation" of
jurisdiction and thus falls within an exception to the general rule which exception was
explained and preserved in Code, and not eliminated by Giusti.
Rule 7(f)(2) requires the parties to submit an order "unless otherwise directed by
the court." Code interpreted this requirement at ^[3 this way:
"It is the district court's role to clearly direct that no order needs to be
submitted; otherwise, an order is required. A court should include this
explicit direction whenever it intends a document - to constitute its final
action. Otherwise, rule 7(f)(2) requires the preparation and filing of an order
to trigger finality for purposes of appeal." (Emphasis added.)
Thus Code equates "clearly" with "explicitly." Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.) does the
same by defining "explicit" this way:
"Not obscure or ambiguous, having no disguised meaning or reservation.
Clear in understanding."
Giusti at ^[3 states:
"First, or broad holding in Code is inclusive of all final district court
decisions, regardless of how they are styled. We held that 'whenever' a
court intends any 'document' to constitute its final action, the court must
explicitly direct that no additional order is necessary."
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Giusti in using the word "explicitly" does not appear to be attempting to give it any other
meaning than that given it in Code, to-wit: "clearly." In short, if it is clear it is explicit.

^

Why did Judge Peterson entitle the document "Ruling and Order?" It appears evident that
he used that phrase to "direct" the parties that this was not just a ruling, but that it was also
the order formalizing and finalizing that ruling for all purposes. When a judge uses those
words, can counsel tell him that he is not being clear enough? Judge Peterson surely
i

wasn't telling the lawyers "Gentlemen, there are rulings, and then there are orders, and
then there are orders on top of orders. My document covers the first two, but you need to
prepare the third one." What he is clearly telling the lawyers is that this is the ruling and
the order thereon and that ends it. The parties so understood it, and no one is quarreling
with jurisdiction except the Court of Appeals, which appears to be saying that clear is not
enough, and that the district court has to use the magic words "no other order is required"
or appellate jurisdiction cannot exist. We think that is not what Code and Giusti stand for.
In addition to the foregoing, however this case comes within an exception to the
general rule of Code and Giusti which we now discuss:
C. HOLDING IN CODE ACKNOWLEDGES AND PRESERVES EXCEPTION
TO THE GENERAL RULE:
Code was in the Supreme Court On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals, and
the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. In Code the District Court had entered
a memorandum decision dismissing plaintiffs complaint. The defendant in that case
(prevailing party on said motion) did not prepare a separate order, but plaintiff did, and
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the same was duly entered, and plaintiff based her appeal on the latter. The Court of
Appeals held that the time for appeal ran from the entry of the Memorandum Decision
and not from the entry of the later order, and that plaintiffs appeal was therefore
untimely. The Supreme Court reversed and held the appeal timely.
The general rule of Code however only applies to cases involving the issue of
barring the appeal, because Code expressly acknowledged an exception to that general
rule for cases where the issue was "preservation" of the appeal. Code held at \ 8:
"We recognize that this court has, on occasion, determined that finality
supporting appellate jurisdiction exists by looking to the content and effect
of a signed memorandum decision or minute entry. Dove v. Cude, 710 P.2d
170, 171 n. 1 (Utah 1985); Cannon v. Keller, 692 P.2d 740, 741 n. 1 (Utah
1984). In those cases, we suggested that when the ruling 'constituted a
resolution of the dispute5 or 'specifie[d] with certainty a final determination
of the rights of the parties,' appellate jurisdiction was proper. Dove, 710
P.2d at 171 n.l; Cannon, 692 P.2d at 741 n. 1. Review of those cases
makes clear that they resulted in the preservation of the appeal rights of the
parties. While these cases remain good authority for that purpose, we
decline to use their analysis to bar appeal rights, as the analysis of the court
of appeals would do." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the Supreme Court clearly holds that Dove v. Cudey supra, and Cannon v. Keller,
supra, remain good authority" where the issue is "preservation" of appeal rights.
Dove at Note 1 of that decision held that a signed "minute entry" was sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on the appellate court because it "constituted a resolution of the
dispute by precluding a trial setting and reimposing the default judgment." Likewise,
Cannon at Note 1 of that decision held that a signed "Memorandum Decision" was
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i
sufficient to confer jurisdiction where "the ruling specifies with certainty a final
determination of the rights of the parties and is susceptible of enforcement." We are
dealing in this appeal now before this court, with a Rule 59 U.R.C.P. motion for a new
trial, which was not involved in either Giusti or Code. All that was required in this case
was a granting or denial of the motion. The "Ruling and Order On Defendant's Motion
For A New Trial" by the trial court unequivocally denies the motion for a new trial, and
thereby accomplishes the only thing that it needed to accomplish, and thus readily meets
the requirements of Dove and Cannon, and so comes within the exception as spelled out in
Code and which is in no way nullified by Giusti, and thus remains "good authority."
It appears clear that what the Supreme Court was saying in Code is that appellate
jurisdiction will be upheld in preservation of jurisdiction cases when the lower court
ruling "constituted a resolution of a dispute" [Dove] or when such ruling "specifies with
certainty a final determination of the rights of the parties and is susceptible of
enforcement" [Cannon], but that the Supreme Court will not use the analysis in Dove and
Cannon "to bar appeal rights," and therefore in cases involving barring appeal rights, the
appeal time runs from the lower court's own order only if it was an order prepared and
submitted with an original memorandum or the lower court's own order clearly
(expressly) informs counsel that nothing further is being required. Otherwise the appeal
time runs from entry of an order thereafter prepared by one of the parties.
D. HOLDING IN GIUSTI EXTENDS CODE TO ORDERS OF ALL KINDS
BUT DOES NOT ELIMINATE EXCEPTION AS PRESERVED IN CODE, WHERE
ISSUE IS PRESERVATION OF APPEAL:
16
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The general rule of Code as applicable to cases contesting jurisdiction is set forth
at If 6:
"The plain language of rule 7(f)(2) does not permit overriding the
requirement of an order by implication or inference. Either an order must
be submitted by the prevailing party or the court must give the parties
explicit direction that no order is required. We see no benefit to a system in
which parties must guess, on a case-by-case basis, whether a judge's
language in a memorandum decision implies],5 inciters],'or
'contemplate]' further action by the parties."
In short Giusti adopts the same general rule but in f 36 clarifies the Code rule as follows:
"While we spoke in terms of a memorandum decision because that was the
issue before us in Code, we take this opportunity to clarify that the rule's
requirements and the policy supporting the rule apply to all final decisions,
regardless of how they are styled."
Thus Giusti clarifies that the Code rule is not limited to memorandum decisions, but that
clarification does not purport to eliminate the exception as set out in Code for cases
involving preservation of jurisdiction.
E. COURT OF APPEALS LACKS AUTHORITY TO OVERRULE SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS IN DOVE V. CUBE AND CANNON V. KELLER AS
ACKNOWLEDGED AND PRESERVED IN CODE:
If the Supreme Court intended by the ruling in Giusti to overrule Code in any
respect, but through oversight did not do so, then it would appear that only the Supreme
Court can correct such an oversight, and the Court of Appeals cannot do it for them. We
trust however that the Supreme Court meant what it said when it acknowledged the Code
exception, and that there was no oversight in not overruling the Code exception in Giusti.
After being reversed in Code, the Court of Appeals claims to be on board with
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Supreme Court in Giusti, but in dismissing the current appeal the Utah Court of Appeals
goes too far, and now refuses to acknowledge the exception created by Code for cases
involving preservation of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals is saying in effect that Dove
and Cannon are not good law, and we will go along with Giusti but we refuse to
acknowledge the Supreme Court's Code exception. This matter therefore falls squarely
within Rule 46 (a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides for
Supreme Court review:
"When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of state or
federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme
Court."
Since Giusti did not overrule the exception acknowledged in Code, the Court of
Appeals in attempting to do so has exceeded its authority, and its decision "is in conflict
with a decision of the Supreme Court."
F. COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION SETS AN UNNECESSARY AND
UNWISE PRECEDENT:
The Court of Appeal in dismissing the current appeal is stating in effect that unless
the lower court uses the magic words "no other order is necessary" that the appellate
courts have no jurisdiction under any circumstances. That appears to be an unnecessary
and unwise restriction on jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court wisely recognized in Code
that preservation of jurisdiction cases don't involve "a system in which parties must
guess, on a case-by-case basis, whether a judge's language in a memorandum decision
'implie[s],' ;invite[s],' or ccontemplate[s]' further action by the parties." Such cases
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therefore do not need the "bright line" referred to by the Court of Appeals, and the
preservation of the Code exception permits the continued application of practical
solutions where they are called for, as in Dove and Cannon and in the present case.
G. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION CREATES CONFUSION:
The decision of the Court of Appeals does not eliminate confusion, but rather has
created confusion where none existed. Before the current decision of the Court of
Appeals, it was clear that for purposes of opposing jurisdiction, it was necessary to show
compliance with Rule 7(f)(2). For purposes of preserving jurisdiction, such compliance
was not required where the decision "constituted a resolution of the dispute" or
"speciflefd] with certainty a final determination of the rights of the parties." The Court
of Appeals has now held that strict interpretation applies to both cases opposing
jurisdiction and to cases preserving jurisdiction, but since the Court of Appeals cannot
overrule decisions of the Supreme Court, their decision does not technically overrule the
Code exception, nevertheless, as a practical matter, a litigant confronted with a
preservation of appeal case, is now left to ponder whether the Code exception is the law
or whether this decision of the Court of Appeals seemingly overruling the Code
exception is now being accepted by the Supreme Court as the law.
H. GIUSTI AND CODE WERE INTENDED TO PREVENT INJUSTICE NOT
TO FOSTER IT:
Both Giusti and Code were cases where the prevailing party was attempting to
have the appellate court throw out the loser's appeal on the basis that the appeal was
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untimely. In both cases, instead of proceeding with the appeal on the basis of the court's
own decision (minute entry in Code and order in Giusti), the losing party submitted a
subsequent order and proceeded with the appeal based on the latter. The prevailing party
in each case claimed that in so doing, the appeal time as measured from the court's
decision (minute entry in Code and order in Giusti) had expired before the appeal was
perfected. In effect the court in Giusti and Code was refusing to disallow an appeal when
the losing party had done all that could reasonably have been expected of them, and were
designed to prevent gross injustice.
We are not dealing with that situation in the present appeal. The issue here is
whether an appeal timely taken and which was (1) based upon a "Ruling and Order"
which was clearly and explicitly intended as a final order, (2) which unequivocally
denied the motion for new trial which is all it needed to do, (3) where no one was in fact
misled and (4) where no one is contesting jurisdiction should be gratuitously dismissed?
Surely, the Supreme Court answered this question in the negative in Code. The Court of
Appeals decision in effect uses cases designed to prevent injustice to create injustice. We
certainly do not wish to imply any malice to the actions of that court or any of its
members, as they no doubt felt that the "bright line" they seek is worth a few casualties
along the way.
Such a destructive bright line is not necessary. Prior to the said decision of the
Court of Appeals, if a litigant sought to "bar appeal rights" the litigant had to show that
the order in question was submitted by one of the parties, or if the order in question was
20
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prepared by the court, that it contains a clear (explicit) direction that no other order is
necessary. In cases where no one was seeking to "bar appeal rights" appellate
jurisdiction was established if the requirements of Dove or Cannon were met This is
the holding of Code, and this "system" [Code \ 6] appears to be totally workable, does
not call for guessing, and leaves no one at risk for having chosen incorrectly.
Although Rule 7(f)(2) did not exist at the time of the decisions in Dove and
Cannon, that fact was known to the Supreme Court when it decided Code in 2007. Had
the Supreme Court intended that its strict interpretation of Rule 7(f)(2) apply equally to
all cases (both those where the issue is barring the appeal as well as where the issue is
preserving the appeal), the Supreme Court would not have expressly stated as it did that
Dove and Cannon "remain good authority" for the purpose of "preservation" of appeals.
That would seem to be the last thing the court would say.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the general rule of Code and Giusti is to prevent a party from
losing that party's appeal rights because the party "guessed" wrong as to what a "judge's
language" means. That is no doubt a good rule. There is no reason however to extend it
to cases where appeal rights are not on the line, and no one has been misled, and there is
no problem, except the problem that will be created by an unwarranted extension of the
strict rule to cases where it is not needed. Such an extension will force the parties to
jump through extra hoops to get back to the same place they are now, albeit with an
attendant loss of time and resources. Such a procedure would not seem to square with the
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requirements of Rule 1, U.R.C.P. which provides in relevant part:
"They [the rules] shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."
Although the aforesaid exception does not appear in any way to be misleading or
otherwise improper, if for any reason the Supreme Court now feels that said exception
was improvident, it would appear that it should be changed by amending said Rule
7(f)(2), not by unnecessarily dismissing appeals which have already been properly
perfected. The decision of the Court of Appeal should be reversed, and King's appeal
reinstated and allowed to proceed.
Dated the

^1 day of

jQfy

, 2011.

Gordon A. Madsen
Robert C. Cummings
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
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DUCHESNE COUNfurrAH

NOV 0 8 2010
-DEPUTY

Perrin R. Love (Bar No. 5505)
Wendy Bowden Crowther (Bar No. 8842)
Joseph D. Kesler (Bar No. 12138)
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS
201 South Main Street
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)322-2516
Facsimile: (801)521-6280
Attorneys for Plaintiff Central Utah Water Conservancy District

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE EIGHTH DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH
CENTRAL UTAH WATER
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, a Water
Conservancy District organized under the
laws of the State of Utah,

FINAL JUDGMENT OF
CONDEMNATION

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 060800063
vs.

Honorable Edwin T. Peterson
SHANE KING as TRUSTEE and/or
FIDUCIARY OWNER of STEPPING
STONE TRUST,
Defendant.
This condemnation action came on for trial beginning October 12,2010, before the Court
and jury, the Honorable Edwin T. Peterson presiding. Plaintiff Central Utah Water Conservancy
District (the District") was represented by Perrin R. Love and Wendy B. Crowther of Clyde
{00186187-1}
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Snow & Sessions. Defendant Shane King as Trustee and/or fiduciary owner of Stepping Stone
Trust ("Stepping Stone") was represented by Gordon A. Madsen and Robert C. Cummings.
The parties concluded the presentation of evidence and rested their cases on October 14,
2010. The Court instructed the jury as to the law to be applied and counsel for each party
presented closing argument.
On October 14, 2010, after due deliberation, the jury returned in open court a Special
Verdict, which is incorporated by reference, in favor of Stepping Stone in total amount of
$56,100.00. The Court polled the jury, and each and every juror stated affirmatively that
$56,100.00 was that juror's verdict.
The Court then excused the jury. On the Special Verdict, the Court then entered in
handwriting: "Total judgment of $56,100.00, plus statutory interest on [$]27,700.00 from
statutorily required date." The Court signed and dated the handwritten entry of judgment.
Based upon the Special Verdict returned by the jury, the handwritten judgment entered by
the Court on October 14, 2010, the Judgment entered by the Court on August 28, 2007, and the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Plaintiffs Motion for Occupancy and on
Defendants' Affirmative Defenses, also entered by the Court on August 28, 2007, and with good
cause appearing, the Court hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES:
1.

The Property legally described in Exhibit A to this Final Judgment of

Condemnation, known as Lots 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, and 95 of the Crescent Lakes Subdivision,
Duchesne County, Utah, consisting of 2.22 acres, more or less, together with all appurtenances
{00186187-1}
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and improvements (the "Property"), but excluding any and all water, mineral, oil, and/'or gas
rights, is condemned and acquired by the District.
2.

The use of the Property for reservoir purposes is a necessary public use authorized

by the Utah Eminent Domain Code, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-6-1 et. seq.
3.

Judgment is entered in favor of defendant Stepping Stone in the total amount of

$56,100.00, or $27,700.00 ("Additional Just Compensation") in addition to the $28,400.00 that
was previously deposited and withdrawn from Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9(3)
and (6) (the predecessor statute of Utah Code. Ann. § 78B-6-510(3) and (6)).
4.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-510(5)(c), judgment shall include interest at

the rate of 8% per annum on $27,700.00 of Additional Just Compensation, beginning August 1,
2006, and ending on the October 14, 2010, the date the Court entered Judgment on the jury
verdict. The total amount of interest awarded pursuant to § 78B-6-510(5)(c) is $9,320.00.
5.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4, judgment shall also include post-judgment

interest at the rate of $2.41% beginning on October 15, 2010, and ending on the date payment is
made or tendered.
6.

Each party shall bear its own fees, expenses and costs. No costs shall be awarded

pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d).
7.

A copy of this Final Judgment of Condemnation shall be filed with the County

Recorder of Duchesne County, State of Utah, and the rights and interests of Stepping Stone in
and to the Property, except as expressly excluded herein, shall vest in the District.

[This space intentionally left blank.]
{00186187-1}
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DATED this / y

day of November 2010.
BY THE COURT:

Approved as to form:

fGor;i6n A Madsen
"Robert C. Cummings
Attorneys for Defendant Shane King as Trustee
and/or fiduciary owner of Stepping Stone Trust

Dated:

(00186187-1)
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DUCHESS UO^TY, UTAH

JO^NEfc^EE, CLERK
BY M i ^
DEPUTY
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CENTRAL UTAH WATER
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, a Water
Conservancy District organized under the
laws of the State of Utah,,

RULING AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,
Case No. 060800063
vs.
Judge EDWIN T. PETERSON
SHANE KING, as Trustee and/or Fiduciary
Owner of Stepping Stone Trust,,
Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial.
Under rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a new trial maybe granted "in the
interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon
the rights of a party." The Defendant raises two (2) general areas of concern in the motion for a
new trial, both of which involve rulings made in either pre-trial hearing or at trial. It should be
noted that Defendant was given the opportunity to fully argue the issues prior to the Court ruling
on them, and to make objections to those rulings thereby creating a record for appeal during the
course of the litigation. Defendants motion for a new trial therefore consists wholly of issues
which were argued and ruled upon. The Court, having considered the issued raised by Defendant
in the motion for a new trial finds nothing in the various rulings that justify a new trial. The
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issues raised by Defendant may be the appropriate basis for an appeal of those rulings but does
not provide a basis for a motion for a new trial. As previously noted each issue raised by
Defendant was fully argued during the hearing (s) on those issues, therefore the Court would not
be assisted by redundant oral argument of those issues and will rule on the motion without oral
argument.
The Defendant's Motion for a New Trial is denied.
Dated this

"?3

day of

^<JJ&C2-\J*<^-^

2011.

BY THE COURT:

EDWIN T. PETERSON, District Court Judge
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DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH

MAR 0 9 2011
GORDON A. MADSEN, #2048
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS, #77 7
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
1224 Chandler Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone 801-364-3431

yn f „

RECEIVED
MAR 0 9 2011

8th District Juvenile Court

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE EIGHTH DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH
CENTRAL UTAH WATER CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT, A Water Conservancy
District organized under the laws
of the State of Utah,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
Case No.
SHANE KING, as Trustee and/or
Fiduciary Owner of Stepping Stone
Trust,

060800063

Judge Edwin T. Peterson

Defendant and Appellant.
NOTICE IS hereby given that the defendant and appellant,
Shane King, as Trustee and/or Fiduciary Owner of Stepping Stone
Trust, by and through his attorneys of record, Gordon A. Madsen and
Robert C. Cummings, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of Utah
from the above entitled

District Court of the Eighth Judicial

District in and for Duchesne County, Utah,

(1) from the final

judgment, entitled "Final Judgment of Condemnation" entered herein
on November 8, 2010; (2) . from the ruling of September 20, 2010
denying in part the motion in limine of defendant and appellant and

-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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written order entered pursuant thereto on or about October 13,
2010, if any; (3) from the Order endorsed on the verdict on October
14, 2010, at the conclusion of the trial;

(4) from the order

denying motion for new trial of defendant and appellant, entered
herein on February

8, 2011 and entitled

"Ruling and Order on

Defendant's Motion for a New Trial;" and

(5) from any and all

appealable interim or other rulings and orders in this action. This
appeal is taken from said judgments, orders and rulings in their
entirety, except that no appeal is taken from the portions of said
motion in limine which were granted.
DATED the

ft

day of March, 2011.

GORDON A. MADSEN
y ^
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
'
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
Mailed copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal together with
copy of Appellate Cost Bond to Perrin R. Love and Wendy Bowden
Crowther, attorneys for plaintiff and appellee, at their address,
One

Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor, 201 So Main Street,

84111,

postage prepaid, the

&

SLC, UT

day of March, 2011.

y

Attorney for Defendant and
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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Central Utah Water Conservancy
District,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

)

Shane King, as Trustee and/or Fiduciary
Owner of Stepping Stone Trust,

)
)
)

Defendant and Appellant.

)

SUA SPONTE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

Case No. 20110232-CA

TO THE ABOVE PARTIES AND/OR THEIR ATTORNEYS:
This appeal is being considered for summary disposition on the basis that this
court may lack jurisdiction as the appeal does not appear to be taken from a final,
appealable order. See Utah R. App. P. 3.
In order to constitute a final, appealable order, a district court's ruling or order
must explicitly direct that no additional order is necessary. See Giusti v. Sterling
Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, Ti 27-32, 201 P.3d 966. When the district court's order
does not expressly state that its order is the final order of the court and that no further
order need be prepared, rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires the
preparation and entry of a separate order in conformity with the district court's
decision. See i d % 28. The requirements of rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure apply to every final decision issued by the district court. See i d % 36. The
district court's ruling on the motion for a new trial does not appear to comply wit this
rule.
DOCUMENT
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In lieu of a brief, the parties shall file a memorandum, not to exceed ten pages,
explaining why summary disposition should, or should not, be granted by the court.
Failure to file a memorandum may result in the dismissal of the appeal without
prejudice to the filing of a timely appeal from a final order.
An original and four copies of the memorandum should be filed with the clerk of
the Utah Court of Appeals on or before
May 3,2011.
DATED this \\

day of April, 2011.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on April 11, 2011, a true and correct copy of the foregoing SUA
SPONTE MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION was deposited in the United States
mail or placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to:
PERRIN R. LOVE
WENDY BOWDEN CROWTHER
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS
201 S MAIN ST 13TH FLR
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-2216
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
GORDON A MADSEN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1224 CHANDLER DR
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84103
Dated this April 11, 2011.

Judicial Assistant
Case No. 20110232
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fl
Shane King, as Trustee and/or Fiduciary Owner of Stepping Stone Trust, appeals
from a November 8, 2010 judgment and a February 8, 2011 ruling on King's motion for
a new trial. This matter is before the court on a sua sponte motion for summary

DOCUMENT 5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

disposition based upon lack of jurisdiction due to the absence of a final, appealable
order. We dismiss the appeal without prejudice.
12
Generally, "[a]n appeal is improper if it is taken from an order or judgment that
is not final/7 Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, 1 9, 5 P.3d 649. In fact, this court lacks
jurisdiction to consider an appeal unless it is taken from a final, appealable order. See id.
18.
13
In Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, 201 P.3d 966, the supreme court
held that if a district court intends its minute entry or its self-prepared order to be final,
the district court "must explicitly direct that no additional order is necessary/' Id. 1 32.
When the district court does not expressly direct that its order is the final order of the
court, rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires the prevailing party, or
the non-prevailing party when necessary, to prepare and file an order to trigger finality
for purposes of appeal. See id. 1 30.
14
The February 8, 2011 order denying the motion for a new trial does not satisfy
the requirements set forth in Giusti, While the district court may have intended the
order to be its final order, the district court did not expressly indicate that the order was
the final order of the court and that no further order was required. Furthermore, no
party prepared a final order as required by rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
15
King argues that Giusti does not apply to this case because the rule announced in
Giusti only applies to attempts to bar jurisdiction and not to cases meant to preserve
jurisdiction. This is not the case. The supreme court created a bright line rule for
litigants because "[t]he strict application of rule 7(f)(2) supports the judicial policy
favoring finality, and it prevents the confusion that often leads-as it has here-to
additional litigation when parties are left to divine when a court's decision has triggered
the appeal period/' Id. 1 36. Thus, the order denying the motion for a new trial is not
final for purposes of appeal, and this court is required to dismiss the appeal. See VarianEimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating that if the court
lacks jurisdiction over an appeal, it has only the authority to dismiss the action).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

f6
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a timely
appeal from a final order.

a

£M4M * 7rt
Carolyn K/McHugh,

.

Associate Presiding Judge

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

J. Inrederic Yoros Jr., Judge
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
"-00000""

U

™H APPELLATE COURTS

Central Utah Water Conservancy District,

OCT fl ^ ?ftff

Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 20110618-SC
Shane King,
Defendant and Petitioner.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on July 20, 2011.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is granted as
to the following issue.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Petitioner's
appeal without prejudice on the ground the order denying a motion for
new trial did not satisfy the requirements of this Court's decision in
Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, 201 P. 3d 966, and rule
7(f)(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

A briefing schedule will be established hereafter.

For The Court:

Dated

ioK-1

Matthew B. Durranf
Associate Chief Justice
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